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INTRODUCTION

In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the federal lodestar'
method of calculating reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Florida's feeshifting statutes in the seminal case of Florida Patient's Compensation
Fund v. Rowe.2 At the crux of its decision to apply the lodestar approach
was the court's desire to provide Florida's trial courts with specific guidelines to aid in the setting of attorney fees and the belief that the lodestar
method provided an "objective structure" for doing so. 3 Little did the
* This note is dedicated to my parents, Donald and Lynne Lambert, for their never-ending
supply of support and encouragement. Also, special thanks to Todd Stewart for his help and
suggestions.
I. Ironically, Webster's New Universal UnabridgedDictionary defines lodestar as "a guiding
ideal; a model for imitation." WEBSTER'S NEw UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1062 (Deluxe
2d ed. 1983).
2. 472 So. 2d 1145, 1146 (Fla. 1985).
3. Id. at 1150. The court sought a more analytical framework for determining attorney fees to
combat what it called, "a perceived lack of objectivity and uniformity in court-determined reasonable
attorney fees." Id. at 1149.
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court realize that its decision in Rowe would accomplish precisely the opposite of its intent.
The subsequent case-law development under Rowe raised a number

of issues which forced the Florida Supreme Court to refine its initial decision.4 Despite the court's willingness to clarify the proper application of
the lodestar method under Rowe, Florida's district courts of appeal continued to muddy the waters by issuing conflicting interpretations of Rowe
and its progeny.' Nowhere has this conflict been as intense as in the application of a contingency risk multiplier to enhance the base lodestar figure.' More specifically, Florida's district courts of appeal have been especially divided on the issue of whether the lodestar method and
contingency risk multiplier should be used in 7calculating reasonable attorney fees pursuant to attorney charging liens.

As a result of this conflict, attorneys in Florida who earn their livings
by way of contingency fee agreements are faced with a patchwork of decisions leading to inconsistency at best and inequitable fee awards at worst.,
Such an unjust result can occur when an attorney is discharged by her
client prior to the occurrence of the contingency, and must seek an equitable determination of her fees under a valid charging lien.
The purpose of this note is to clarify some of the underlying theories
4. Lane v. Head, 566 So. 2d 508, 510-11 (Fla. 1990) (recognizing that Rowe allowed the use of
a contingency risk multiplier in situations involving partial contingency fee agreements); Standard
Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 834 (Fla. 1990) (extending the use of the lodestar
method to tort and contract claims for attorney fees); Perez-Borroto v. Brea, 544 So. 2d 1022, 1023
(Fla. 1989) (holding that Rowe applies to both plaintiffs and defendants seeking court determination
of attorney fees under the lodestar approach); Miami Children's Hosp. v. Tamayo, 529 So. 2d 667,
668 (Fla. 1988) (holding that all factors described in Rowe must be applied whenever the lodestar
method is used).
5. See Trend Coin Co. v. Fuller, Feingold & Mallah, P.A., 538 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. 3d DCA
1989) (refusing to apply Rowe to a charging lien); Boyette v. Martha White Foods, 528 So. 2d 539,
540-41 (1st DCA) (applying lodestar to attorney charging lien, but refusing to use contingency risk
multiplier), rev. denied, 538 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1988); Reisgo v. Weinstein, 523 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla.
2d DCA 1988) (applying lodestar and the risk multiplier to attorney charging lien calculations);
Barton v. McGovern, 504 So. 2d 457, 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (applying lodestar and the contingency risk multiplier to attorney charging lien calculations).
6. See cases cited supra note 5. See generally Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 830-33 (discussing
various theories and arguments underlying the use of the contingency risk multiplier).
7. See infra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
8. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1149. As far back as the Rowe decision, the Florida Supreme Court
recognized the increase in court determined attorney fees would require careful scrutiny to avoid
deteriorating the "credibility of the court system and the legal profession." Id. For that reason, the
court adopted the lodestar approach, including the use of a contingency risk multiplier, to provide an
objective and consistent method of reasonably compensating attorneys for their work. Id. at 1150-51.
Thus, the conflict surrounding the use of lodestar and the contingency risk multiplier not only serves
to deprive many attorneys of reasonable compensation for their work, but undermines the basic objective advocated by the Florida Supreme Court in Rowe. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss1/3

2

Lambert: Murder by Numbers: Calculating Reasonable Attorney Fees Pursuant
CALCULATING REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES

behind the use of the lodestar method and contingency risk multiplier and
to dispel some of the misconceptions arising from their application. Part
II of the note describes both the federal and Florida development of the
lodestar method and contingency risk multiplier. Part III gives a brief
discussion of the source and purpose of the attorney charging lien as used
in Florida. Part IV analyzes the application of the lodestar method and
contingency risk multiplier to contingency fee agreements. The note focuses on determining reasonable attorney fees under an attorney charging
lien attached pursuant to a discharged attorney's contingency fee agreement. Finally, part V proposes a solution for the proper application of the
contingency risk multiplier to court awarded reasonable attorney fees calculated pursuant to a charging lien resulting from an attorney's discharge
from a contingency fee contract.
II.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LODESTAR METHOD OF
CALCULATING REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES

A.

FederalDevelopment of the Lodestar Method

The lodestar method of calculating attorney fees was first enunciated
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Lindy Brothers Builders v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy 1).9 In that case,
the Third Circuit was asked to determine a reasonable attorney fee under
the equitable fund doctrine. 10 While noting that the district judge had
broad discretion in awarding attorney fees, the Third Circuit overturned
the lower court's fee award because of the lower court's failure to sufficiently support its conclusion as to the amount of fees awarded."1 The
circuit court stated that a mere listing of factors considered by the lower
court in determining its fee award provided little basis for review by appellate courts."2 Concluding that the purpose of awarding attorney fees
was to compensate an attorney for the reasonable value of his services,'"
the court sought to establish a more objective basis for valuing those
services. 4

9. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
10. Id. at 165. The equitable fund doctrine gives courts authority to award attorney fees under
the general equitable powers of the court. Id. The power is generally used to compensate individuals

whose actions in court create a benefit for a class of people who are not party to the litigation. Id.
11.

Id. at 166. The district judge listed four factors considered in the fee award granted: per-

centage of recovery awarded to attorneys in other cases, the amount of recovery, the amount received
by the attorneys under private agreements with their clients, and the time spent in connection with
the litigation. Id.
12.

Id. at 166-67.

13. Id. at 167.
14.

Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

The result of the Lindy I court's analysis was a four-step process that
provided a systematic approach to calculating reasonable attorney fees.15
The first step required the trial court to determine the number of hours
spent by the attorney on the case and the manner in which the hours were
spent.'" The purpose of this exercise was to give the court some indication

of "the nature of the services for which [the] compensation [was]
sought.' 1 7 The second step required the court to ascertain the value of the
services provided by the attorney seeking compensation.', The goal of this
step was to determine a reasonable hourly rate for the services provided.'"
The third step required multiplication of the number of hours expended
by the reasonable hourly rate determined in the second step.20 This figure
was intended to constitute reasonable compensation and be the "lodestar"" of the court's fee determination.2 2
Calculating the lodestar figure, however, did not end the court's inquiry into the reasonable value of an attorney's services.2" Once the lodestar figure was calculated, the Lindy I decision required courts to factor
in both the quality of the attorney's services2 4 and the contingent nature

of a case's success. 25 Factoring in the contingent nature of a case's success
eventually led to the use of the contingency risk multiplier, an integral
and necessary step in the lodestar method of calculating reasonable attorney fees under Lindy 1.26

The Third Circuit reaffirmed its application of the lodestar method

15. Id. at 167-68.
16. Id. at 167. The court did not require an exact computation of hours and minutes spent,
dissected and apportioned to discrete types of work. Id. However, the court did expect some specific
information concerning the number of hours spent on different activities. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. In determining the appropriate hourly rate, the attorney's reputation and status were to
be taken into account as were the different activities undertaken by the attorney. Id.
20. Id.
21. See supra note 1.
22. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167-68.
23. Id. at 168.
24. Id. Since Lindy I, the United States Supreme Court has severely limited the enhancement
of the lodestar figure to reflect quality of services. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-99 (1984). In
Blum, the Court reasoned that quality of representation was already reflected in the reasonable
hourly rate and only in rare and exceptional cases should this factor justify an upward adjustment. Id.
at 899.
25. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168.
26. Id. The Lindy I court recognized the need to account for the contingent nature of a case by
quoting from Judge Wyzanski's opinion in Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55 (D.
Mass. 1963) ("No one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent upon his success to charge,
when successful, as little as he would charge a client who in advance had agreed to pay for his
services."). Lindy I, 487 F. 2d at 168 (quoting Cherner, 221 F. Supp. at 61).
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and refined the use of the contingency enhancement of the lodestar figure

in the subsequent decision of Lindy Brothers Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy I). 17 Of particular importance
in the Lindy I holding was the court's provision of specific factors to be
used in quantifying a case's contingent nature of success. 8 By requiring
courts to consider these factors before applying a contingency enhancement of the lodestar figure, the Third Circuit provided the district courts

with a more standardized framework on which to base their determination of an appropriate enhancement.29 Thus, Lindy II held that a district
court applying a contingency enhancement must identify the factors supporting its decision and state a corresponding amount by which the lodestar should be increased. 0 Pursuant to this factored analysis, the Third
Circuit furthered its purpose under Lindy
I of compensating attorneys for
31
the reasonable value of their services.
When faced with review of the proper method of determining reasonable attorney fees, the United States Supreme Court adopted a modified
lodestar method in Hensley v. Eckerhart.3 2 In Hensley, the Court reviewed an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 83 Although the
Court vacated the lower court's decision, the Court adopted the lodestar

method insofar as multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on
the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate to arrive at a starting point for
determining a reasonable fee. 34 However, the Court was not faced with

27. 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976). The court found it necessary to reiterate its position from
Lindy I that the district court need not conduct a detailed investigation of every minute spent on each
activity. Id. at 116. Thus, the court declared, "It was not and is not our intention that the inquiry into
the adequacy of the fee assume massive proportions, perhaps even dwarfing the case in chief." Id.
28. Id. at 117. These factors were separated into three categories. Id. The first was "plaintiff's
burden" which included: "(a) the complexity of the case . . .; (b) the probability of defendant's
liability . . .; and (c) an evaluation of damages." Id. The second was "risks assumed in developing
the case" which included: (a) hours risked without guarantee of payment; (b) out of pocket expenses
advanced by the attorney; and (c) development of expertise by the attorney. Id. The third category
was "the delay in receiving payments for services rendered." Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 118. The provision of specific contingency factors by Lindy I related to the underlying purpose of the lodestar method as described in Lindy L See id. at 116-17. That purpose was to
provide district courts with specific guidelines by which they could calculate reasonable attorney fees.
See Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167. By requiring district courts to support their enhancements of the
lodestar figure, the Lindy I court prevented arbitrary increases in fee awards based on a broad conclusion that a case had a contingent nature of success. See Id. at 166-68.
31. Id. at 167. Lindy II also furthered the goal of providing a more objective and reviewable
system on which fee awards were based. See Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 116-17.
32. 461 U.S. 424, 434, 440 (1983).
33. Id. at 426.
34. Id. at 433. Interestingly, the Court granted district courts leeway not to increase this
award, but to reduce it based on the failure of the party seeking fees to produce sufficient documenta-
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the question of contingency enhancement in Hensley." Thus, the Court
modified the Lindy I approach by allowing fee enhancement only in
cases of exceptional success.36 However, the Court did not specifically define "cases of exceptional success." 7
Recognizing the lack of clarity surrounding the use of enhancement
factors under Hensley, the Court shed some light on the issue in Blum v.
Stenson.3 8 In Blum, the Court reviewed a fifty percent enhancement of a
lodestar figure.3 Upon overturning the lower court decision, the Supreme
Court held that the novelty and complexity of an issue do not justify an
increased fee award. 0 Thus, despite clarifying those factors inappropriate
for enhancing a lodestar figure, the Court failed to indicate additional
factors that would justify enhancement." Specifically, the Court did not
decide whether the contingent nature of success would be an appropriate

tion of hours worked. Id. This discretion is of particular importance in complex cases where the
prevailing party may have succeeded on only some of its claims. See id. at 434-35. In such cases, the
Court granted district courts the discretion to either identify hours to be eliminated or simply reduce
the award based on the limited success. Id. at 436-37. Wielding this sword of discretion, some courts
have slashed fee awards by as much as 75 %. Black Grievance Comm. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 690
F. Supp. 1393, 1396-98 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (multiplying the lodestar amount by 25% to arrive at an
adjusted lodestar).
35. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 426.
36. Id. at 435. Despite this seemingly strict limitation on the use of a lodestar enhancement, the
Court did state that "the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or
downward, including the important factor of the 'results obtained."' Id. at 434. By basing alterations
of the lodestar figure on the results obtained, the Court shifted its inquiry from whether the means
justified the end to whether the end justified the means.
37. See id. at 435 (stating that exceptional success may justify enhancing an award). Several
lower courts, however, have shed some light on when an attorney has achieved exceptional success.
See Clayton v. Thurman, 775 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that a 33% fee enhancement for an attorney who succeeded in vindicating a number of prisoners' constitutional rights was
not an abuse of discretion, although complete relief for all claims was not obtained); Garrity v.
Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 739-40 (1st Cir. 1984) (upholding a 20% fee enhancement for extraordinary
success where attorneys successfully represented mentally ill patients in a state-run facility against
the state government and obtained substantially all the relief sought).

38. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
39. Id. at 891. The district court justified the 50% enhancement based on "the quality of representation, the complexity of the issues, the riskiness of success, and the 'great benefit to a large
class."' Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 898-99. The Court indicated that these factors should be reflected in the number of
hours compensated under the first step of the lodestar method. Id. at 898. Moreover, the Court indicated that "quality of representation" is not a proper basis for enhancing a lodestar figure because
that factor is reflected in the reasonable hourly rate determined under step two of the lodestar analysis. Id. at 899.
41. See id. at 898-902. The Ninth Circuit has specifically addressed this point and held that "a
risky contingency fee agreement constitutes an exceptional circumstance requiring enhancement."
D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 904 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1990).
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basis for enhancing a lodestar figure.42
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of using contingency
risk multipliers in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
(Delaware Valley H) .'

Justice White, in his opinion for the Court,

sought to severely limit the use of a contingency risk multiplier to enhance a lodestar figure.4" In his attack on the use of contingency risk
multipliers, Justice White relied on several theoretical arguments, but
failed to recognize the realities of the legal marketplace.45
For instance, Justice White suggested that compensating attorneys

for the risk they accept by litigating claims under contingency agreements
would encourage attorneys to seek high risk cases in the hopes of increasing their fees by large multipliers.46 If we assume that all attorneys are

42. Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n.17. The Court refused to allow the enhancement of the lodestar
figure based on the contingent nature of success of the case because the record did not identify any
risk accepted by the attorneys that could have resulted in nonpayment. Id. at 901. Thus, the Court in
Blum left open the possibility that a contingency risk factor would be an appropriate basis for lodestar enhancement where there is evidence that the attorney accepted the case with a risk of receiving
no payment at all. Id. at 901 n.17. In fact, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, clearly supported the view that the risk of nonpayment is an appropriate basis for a district court to increase the
lodestar figure. Id. at 902 (Brennan, J., concurring).
43. 483 U.S. 711 (1987). The Delaware Valley case involved two Supreme Court opinions. In
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) (Delaware Valley 1), the
Court rejected the use of an attorney's quality of work as a factor for enhancing a lodestar figure. Id.
at 566-67. In Delaware Valley I, the Court also raised the issue of the use of a contingency risk
multiplier, but specifically reserved ruling on that issue until reargument was heard in Delaware
Valley IL See id. at 568.
44. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 730-31. The Court was split as to how the risk of nonpayment should be factored into the calculation of reasonable fees. Justice White's opinion, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Scalia, called for a maximum risk multiplier of one-third,
applicable only where there was evidence that the plaintiff would have had difficulty in finding counsel. Id. Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the judgment, was not so severe in her limitation of the
use of a risk factor. Id. at 731-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Instead, she called for a new approach
which based risk enhancement on the relevant market in which the case was litigated. Id. at 733.
Thus, contingency cases would be judged as a class. Id. If the party could prove that contingency
cases were compensated differently, as a class, in the relevant market, then an enhancement would be
appropriate. Id. Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, called
for a complete market approach. Id. at 735-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Under this approach, the
use of a multiplier would be premised on the desire to bring court awarded fees in line with what the
private market would bear. Id. at 737. A contingency factor would, therefore, be appropriate if: (1)
the case was taken on a contingency basis; (2) the attorney was unable to mitigate the risk of not
receiving payment; and (3) "other economic risks were aggravated by the contingency of payment."
Id. at 747.
45. Compare id. at 724-31 (discussing justifications for limiting the use of a contingency risk
multiplier) with id. at 731-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the use of a contingency risk
multiplier should be based on how the market treats contingency cases as a class).
46. Id. at 725; see also John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90
YALE LJ. 473, 491-97 (1981) (discussing how contingency multipliers could produce undesirable
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driven solely by economic theories, this would be a very persuasive argument. However, the reality of the legal marketplace and human nature
47
make this argument much more speculative.

The argument assumes that lawyers are not risk averse and would be

just as willing to take on one high risk case with a potential $200,000 fee
award as ten low risk cases each worth $20,000.48 This assumption fails
on several fronts. First, high risk cases will generally require a great deal
more effort and expense to litigate than low risk cases. 49 Thus, attorneys
must be willing to invest a great deal of time and money to accept such a
case on a contingency fee basis, understanding that they are likely to lose
and receive no compensation.5 0 Moreover, high risk cases are likely to
take much longer to resolve than simple cases. 5 ' Defendants will be un-

results). In his article, Professor Leubsdorf recognized that a contingency multiplier may create a
"misincentive" to accept highly risky cases with large payoffs while neglecting strong cases with
smaller payoffs. Id. at 492. However, he also recognized that argument's speculative nature. Id. at
493-95.
47. See Leubsdorf, supra note 46, at 497. After raising several of the arguments adopted by
Justice White, Professor Leubsdorf concluded that while there may be better systems to provide
clearer incentives, "the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the present system's incentives at least
remains unascertained." Id.
48. See id. at 493-94. Professor Leubsdorf used the example to indicate that "many people
prefer a guaranteed income of $20,000 to a 10% chance of winning $200,000." Id.
49. See David M. Trubek et al.,
The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 9496 (1983) (explaining factors that may cause an attorney to invest more time in a case). One study
which surveyed thousands of attorneys concerning their cases and the factors which affected their
work on those cases determined that the "typical" composite case: '(1) does not generally reach the
litigation stage; (2) has under $10,000 at stake; (3) is procedurally simple and settled voluntarily; (4)
has some pre-trial activity but does not reach trial, with each side spending 30 hours on the case; and
(5) results in the average plaintiff receiving some award. Id. at 83-84. The study then indicated that
an increase in the stakes, complexity, and duration of a case (the "case characteristics") translated
into a corresponding increase in the time spent on the case, and thus, the effort expended. Id. at 9495, 104.
50. See id. In addition to "case characteristics," the study indicated that "events" also increase
the time spent on a case. Id. at 104. Events were defined as: (1) pleadings; (2) motions and briefs; (3)
discovery; (4) trial; and (5)settlement negotiations. Id. at 97. Other factors included client conferences, factual investigations, and legal research. Id. at 119. Attorneys are promised compensation for
these additional hours under a lodestar calculation. However, the increased hours spent on "events,"
coupled with increased "case characteristics," indicates that "event" intensive, complex cases require
attorneys to pour larger amounts of resources and time into these cases. See id. at 104, 108-09.
Where the attorney is working under a contingency fee agreement as opposed to a fixed fee arrangement, the risk of loss of a fee increases accordingly. Thus, failure to apply a contingency risk multiplier places attorneys working under contingency fees at a distinct disadvantage to those retained on
fixed fee agreements. Consequently, plaintiffs of meager means, unable to retain an attorney on a
fixed fee basis, but faced with complex and event intensive claims may be unable to obtain legal
counsel without the use of the multiplier.
51. See Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court's Denial of Reasonable Attorney's Fees to
Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 588 (1989-1990). Delay
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willing to settle quickly because they have the stronger case at the outset,

and extensive discovery may be needed to prove the plaintiff's case.52 As a
result, attorneys must be willing to wait much longer to collect payment53
for litigating these high risk cases should they beat the odds and win.
Practical reality indicates that only attorneys with extensive resources can

risk cases, and such attorneys are rarely in
afford to accept these high
54
risks.
such
need of taking
Finally, Justice White's argument fails to account for outside factors
that discourage attorneys from accepting exceptionally risky cases. For
instance, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys
from advocating frivolous claims. 55 Pursuing extremely risky cases can expose an attorney to disciplinary actions which are not only financially burdensome, but also can have a devastating effect on an attorney's reputation. Simply stated, these obstacles indicate that the risk does not
56
necessarily justify the reward.

can inhibit attorneys from accepting complex and lengthy cases. See id. Even Charles Dickens recognized the problems of delay in litigation when he wrote, "Through years and years, and lives and
lives, everything goes on, constantly beginning over and over again, and nothing ever ends. And we
can't get out of the suit on any terms, for we are made parties to it." Id. at 588 n.386 (quoting
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 146 (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853)).
52. See id. at 591. This type of delay tactic is especially onerous to small firms representing
plaintiffs against large corporate entities. Id. Under these circumstances, the small firm may be
forced into an unfavorable settlement due to economic hardship resulting from the delay in receiving
a reasonable fee award. Id.; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 n.6 (1989) (giving an
example of how economic hardship caused by delays in payment could deter an attorney from accepting a case).
53. See Sternlight, supra note 51, at 588-91. The curtailment of the use of the contingency risk
multiplier thus fails to properly compensate attorneys working on a contingency fee scale by refusing
to account for the risk of nonpayment. See id. at 585. Consequently, the refusal to apply a contingency enhancement has proven a deterrent to attorneys to accept classes of cases where the enhancement has been severely limited or eliminated. Id. at 563.
54. Cf. id. at 588, 591 (explaining how delays in payment cause hardships for attorneys). The
other side of the coin also favors the application of a risk multiplier. The inherent risks and costs of
accepting high risk cases may discourage many attorneys from seeking them at the outset. Refusing
to apply a contingency .risk multiplier to any recovery further impedes smaller firms from accepting
these cases. This is so because smaller firms willing to accept the risk of speculative cases will only be
compensated by the base lodestar figure which does not take into account risk accepted. Thus, the lost
opportunity costs of pursuing other less risky matters would go uncompensated despite the fact that
the firm successfully litigated a risky case normally valued under a contingency agreement at a rate
higher than the lodestar figure. See id. at 585.
55.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.1 (1992).

56. For example, if five cases, each with a 20% chance of recovery are advanced, the odds are
that four attorneys will come away having lost a great deal of time and money while one is awarded a
fee multiplied by a risk factor reflecting his 20% chance of recovery. The four losers probably will not
take the chance again, while the one winner was simply compensated by a multiplier that accounted
for the risk accepted. Moreover, Justice White's argument that awarding risk multipliers allows the
greatest reward for the weakest cases and the highest penalty for the least culpable parties is inappo-
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In addition to the failure of theoretical analysis to justify the virtual
elimination of the contingency risk enhancement, the underlying premise
that federal application of the lodestar method is based on awarding fees
pursuant to federal fee-shifting statutes further limits the Supreme
Court's constriction on contingency enhancements.5" In Delaware Valley
1, the Court expressly acknowledged that the purpose of calculating reasonable fees pursuant to federal legislation is not to provide the same
compensation an attorney could receive under a private agreement.5 8
Thus, the Court indicated that where an attorney is seeking complete
compensation for the services rendered pursuant to a private agreement,
the applicability of the contingency risk multiplier would require a different analysis.5 9 Consequently, because much of the state court litigation
over reasonable attorney fees involves private agreements, a somewhat
different analysis has been applied.
B.

Florida Development of the Lodestar Method

Prior to the adoption of the lodestar method by the Florida Supreme

Court, courts in Florida used highly subjective standards for calculating

reasonable attorney fees. 60 Generally those standards were based on fac-

site. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 719. Cases can be risky for any number of reasons. An attorney
who accepts a risky case and is able to obtain a judgment for his client has equally proven that his
cause is as deserving of remuneration as the plaintiff who wins on summary judgment. Therefore, he
should be equally compensated for the work he puts into the case, which includes the extra work
inherent in eliminating risk.
57. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 713 (awarding attorney fees pursuant to a fee-shifting
statute currently codified in § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988)); Blum, 465
U.S. at 889 (awarding fees pursuant to a fee-shifting statute currently codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988)
(Supp. III 1991); D'Emanuele, 904 F.2d at 1381 (awarding fees pursuant to a fee-shifting statute
currently codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1988)).
58. Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565 ("Fee-shifting statutes were not designed as a form of
economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys, nor were they intended to replicate exactly
the fee an attorney could earn through a private fee arrangement with his client."). For a brief
discussion of the chronology of the Delaware Valley cases, see supra note 43.
59. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565. The Court based its analysis on the premise that
the aim of federal fee-shifting statutes is to provide incentives to attorneys to help enforce federal
laws and allow private parties to adequately seek redress for their injuries. Id. So long as plaintiffs are
able to obtain legal counsel to advocate their claims, the purpose of the statute would be satisfied. Id.
Based on this analysis, Justice White's conclusion that contingency risk multipliers should be used
only when a party would have difficulty obtaining legal representation was more easily justified. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 731.
60. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Gorgei Enters., 345 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1977) (displaying a particularly interesting example of this lack of objectivity and consistency).
In Gorgei Enters., Judge Grimes indicated that reasonable fees cannot be precisely determined and
that "reasonable men and reasonable judges can differ in opinion." Id. at 414. Thus, trial courts could
award inconsistent fees so long as they fell within a "range of reasonableness." Id.
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tors similar and often identical to those found in the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Canons of Professional Ethics.6 1 While
those factors provided a loose framework for calculating fees, the courts
gave very little guidance concerning how to quantify those factors into a

61. Compare Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982) (basing reasonable fees on
the totality of circumstances surrounding the attorney-client relationship, including factors such as
the time required, the recovery sought, the skill demanded, the results obtained, and the contract that
existed) and Baruch v. Giblin, 164 So. 831, 833 (Fla. 1935) (considering the "amount and value of
the services rendered, the responsibility undertaken, the importance and results of the litigation, and
the time required" in determining attorney fees) and Flagala Corp. v. Hamm, 302 So. 2d 195, 196
(Fla. Ist DCA 1974) (citing to disciplinary rule 2-106 under Canon 2 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics for factors in determining reasonable fees) with FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 4-1.5 (1993) (providing factors for determining reasonable fees).
The Florida Rules of Professional Conduct list the following factors to be considered in determining a reasonable fee in Rule 4-1.5:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for legal services of a
comparable or similar nature;
(4) the significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances and, as
between attorney and client, any additional or special time demands or requests of the
attorney by the client;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the service and the skill, expertise, or efficiency of effort reflected in the actual
providing of such services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and, if fixed as to amount or rate, then
whether the client's ability to pay rested to any significant degree on the outcome of the
representation.
FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.5 (1993).
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct which replaced the previous ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, lists the following factors to be considered in determining reasonable fees:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1992).
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cohesive and consistent process.6 2 Consequently, courts awarded attorney

fees without specifically pointing to the basis for their decisions.63 Thus,
the Florida Supreme Court's admonition in Baruch v. Giblin" that a failure to properly determine attorney fees could result in "a species of social
malpractice that undermines the confidence of the public in the bench and

bar," often went unheeded.6 5
Recognizing the lack of objectivity and uniformity of court determined attorney fees, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the lodestar
method of calculating fees in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v.
Rowe.6 6 However, the court's adoption of the lodestar method was not as
radical a change as the subsequent interpretation of Rowe seemed to indicate. The Rowe decision simply took the factors already employed by the
courts to determine reasonable fees 67 and placed them in a lodestar
framework that required trial courts to be more accurate and consistent in
their calculations. 6 Thus, the actual factors used to calculate reasonable
fees did not change;6 9 the court simply provided specific guidelines as to
their appropriate use.7 °
The more controversial aspect of the Rowe decision was its explicit
recognition of the importance of the contingendy risk multiplier. 71 This
recognition properly accounted for the fact that attorneys accepting cases

62. See Flagala,302 So. 2d at 196 (stating factors to be used in determining attorney fees, yet
providing little guidance in the use of the factors). In Baruch v. Giblin, the Florida Supreme Court
tried to create a more analytical framework for these factors. Giblin, 164 So. 2d at 833-34. There, the
court held that when determining reasonable fees on a quantum meruit basis, the attorney is entitled
only to the reasonable value of his services. Id. at 833. To determine this, the court required trial
courts to use the record of proceedings to ascertain the amount of labor expended and to receive
testimony concerning the value of that labor in addition to other factors. Id. Thus, the court seemed
to outline a precursor to the lodestar method.
63. See Flagala,302 So. 2d at 196. In Flagala, the court specifically cited to those factors
properly considered in calculating reasonable fees. Id. Yet, the court concluded by overturning a $500
award as unreasonably low and awarding $1500 without a single word specifically addressing the
basis for the increase. Id.
64. 164 So. at 831.
65. Id. at 833; see also Gorgei Enters., 345 So. 2d at 414 ("There is a limit to the amount of
attorneys' fees which the public can be expected to accept as being reasonable.").
66. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. In Rowe, the court reviewed a fee awarded
pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1981). Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1146.
67. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
68. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150-51. Rowe specifically required lower courts to use the factors
listed in FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(b). Id. at 1150. These
factors were then specifically incorporated into the lodestar method. Id. For instance, when determining the hourly rate for services provided, the court required consideration of the factors given in DR
2-106. Id.
69. See supra notes 61, 68 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 68.
71. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151.
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on a contingency fee basis risked the possibility of receiving no payment
at all.7 2 Consequently, the court acknowledged that attorneys in this posi73
tion had to charge more than attorneys who were guaranteed payment. Moreover, the Rowe decision recognized that contingency fee agreements
provide average people with increased access to the court system and
competent counsel. 4
Although the court recognized the importance of the contingency risk
multiplier, it also acknowledged its potential drawbacks. 5 Specifically,
the court sought to avoid an infinitely increasing multiplier by providing
specific multipliers for well defined circumstances. 76 Additionally, Rowe
prevented courts from awarding unjustified contingency risk enhancements by prohibiting any court-awarded fee from exceeding the fee specified in the private fee agreement.77 Thus, if the lodestar figure calculated
equalled the specified fee in the private agreement between the parties, no
contingency risk multiplier could be used regardless of the risk involved.78
Consequently, the Rowe decision adequately considered and neutralized
the fear of the United States Supreme Court that multipliers would encourage attorneys to accept high risk cases.79
Subsequent to Rowe, a number of difficulties arose concerning when
method and the requirements of Rowe should be applied by
lodestar
the
80
lower courts. To clarify some of these issues, the Florida Supreme Court
revisited Rowe in Miami Children's Hospital v. Tamayo.81 In Tamayo,

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id. Specifically, the court limited the range of multipliers from 1.5 to 3. Id. If, according to
the trial court, a case was more likely than not to succeed, a multiplier of 1.5 was to be used. Id. If
the likelihood of success and failure were equal at the outset, a multiplier of 2 was to be used. Id. If
success was unlikely at the outset, the multiplier was to be between 2.5 and 3. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. Rowe was decided almost two years before
the Delaware Valley opinions were issued. Compare Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1145 (decided May 2,
1985) with Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 711 (decided June 26, 1987) and Delaware Valley I, 478
U.S. at 546 (decided July 2, 1986).
80. See Trend Coin Co. v. Fuller, Feingold & Mallah, P.A., 538 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. 3d DCA
1989) (refusing to apply Rowe to a quantum meruit determination of a discharged attorney's fee);
Boyette v. Martha White Foods, 528 So. 2d 539, 541 (1st DCA) (applying Rowe, but refusing to
apply a risk multiplier), rev. denied, 538 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1988); Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507
So. 2d 150, 152 (2d DCA) (extending Rowe to contractually based claims), rev. denied, 515 So. 2d
229 (Fla. 1987); Stabinksi, Funt & De Oliveira, P.A. v. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159, 160 (3d DCA)
(refusing to apply Rowe beyond cases involving or ancillary to fee-shifting statutes), rev. denied, 500
So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1986).
81. 529 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1988).
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the court held that whenever the lodestar method applied, all the factors
discussed in Rowe applied. 2 Thus, the court implied that lower courts
had some discretion to determine when the lodestar method was appropriate beyond the specific holding in Rowe which applied only when state
fee-shifting statutes were implicated.8 3 Moreover, Rowe specifically required that a contingency risk multiplier be considered when calculating
reasonable fees. 4 Therefore, any application of the lodestar method to a
calculation of fees pursuant to a contingency fee agreement seemed to
require consideration of a risk multiplier at the very least, if not the actual use of a multiplier.8 5
The Florida Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of using a
contingency risk multiplier in Standard Guarantee Insurance Co. v.
Quanstrom.88 In Quanstrom, the court reviewed an attorney's fee which
was awarded pursuant to Florida Statutes section 627.428.81 The court
specifically sought to address this issue in light of Delaware Valley 1 8
and Blanchard v. Bergeron,8" two United States Supreme Court decisions.9 0 Based on these decisions, the Florida Supreme Court sought to
reevaluate its decision in Rowe91 and readjust the use of the contingency
92
risk multiplier accordingly.
Relying in part on the analysis in Delaware Valley II, the Florida
Supreme Court refined the use of the contingency risk multiplier to reflect
the different types of contingencies that arose under distinct categories of
cases.9 3 Consequently, the court developed separate applications of the
contingency risk multiplier for each of three types of cases in which the
lodestar method was specifically deemed appropriate.94

82. Id. at 668; see also Perez-Borroto v. Brea, 544 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 1989) (reaffirming
Tamayo in that all factors under Rowe apply whenever the lodestar method is used).
83. See supra note 68.
84. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151.
85. See id.
86. 555 So. 2d at 829.
87. Id. Section 627.428 is a fee-shifting statute which awards a reasonable attorney fee to an
insured or named beneficiary who prevails by judgment or decree of a court against an insurer. FLA.
STAT. § 627.428 (1991).
88. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
89. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
90. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 829.
91. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
92. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 830-31.
93. Id. at 833. The court identified two distinct types of contingencies: the "contingency adjustment" and the "contingency fee agreement." Id. The former arose under the construction of feeshifting statutes, while the latter concerned private agreements dictating the amount of payment due
to the attorney upon successful completion of the case. Id.
94. Id. at 833-35.
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The first category involved public policy enforcement cases, such as
discrimination, environmental, and consumer protection issues.9 5 For these
cases, the court adopted the twelve-factor analysis in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express96 for calculating reasonable attorney fees.97
The second category involved tort and contract cases for which the
court readopted the principles of Rowe when calculating reasonable
fees.98 Additionally, the court provided specific guidelines for lower courts
to use when determining whether a multiplier was appropriate. 99 Most
importantly, the court required specific evidence of the given factors to
justify the use of the multiplier.100 The court, recognizing potential difficulties in quantifying risk,101 sought to maintain its previously stated
goals of objectivity and consistency.102 However, without explanation, 0 3
the court also decided to modify the range and application of
multipliers.104

The third category of cases involved family, eminent domain, and
estate and trust proceedings.1 05 For these cases, the court generally pro-

95. Id. at 833.
96. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). Those factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether
the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature
and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases.
Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834 (quoting Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91 n.5 and explaining Johnson, 488
F. 2d at 717-19).
97. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834.
98. Id.
99. Id. Those factors were:
(1) whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel; (2) whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in
any way; and (3) whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe are applicable, especially, the amount involved, the results obtained, and the type of fee arrangement between the attorney and his client.
Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 833.
102. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
103. See Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 836 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 834. The court lowered the upper limit of 3 in Rowe to 2.5. Id. Thus, if a case was
more likely than not to succeed, a multiplier between 1 and 1.5 would be appropriate. Id. If the
chance of success was even, a multiplier from 1.5 to 2 would be appropriate, and if success was
unlikely at the outset, a multiplier of 2 to 2.5 would be appropriate. Id.
105. Id. at 835.
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hibited the use of a multiplier noting that in many such instances contingency agreements were prohibited. 10 8 However, the court left open the
possibility that in some extraordinary cases a risk multiplier would be
acceptable.' 017

The Quanstrom decision resulted in a significant clarification of the
proper use and application of the contingency risk multiplier in most Florida cases.'

8

Quanstrom provided lower courts with specific guidelines and

factors to consider when applying the contingency risk multiplier.10 '
Moreover, the court required specific evidence to support any decision in

which a court applied the multiplier." 0 Thus, Quanstrom significantly
furthered the court's goal of providing an objective and consistent frame-

work for calculating reasonable attorney fees."' Unfortunately, the Quanstrom decision did not end the confusion in cases not specifically covered
by the three categories the court described." 2 Specifically, whether Rowe
and Quanstrom apply to court-determined attorney fees under an equitable charging lien has yet to be determined.

III.

PURPOSE AND USAGE OF ATTORNEY CHARGING LIENS IN FLORIDA

The Supreme Court of Florida has long recognized court-imposed attorney charging liens as an equitable method of assuring proper payment

of an attorney's fees."' However, Florida, unlike other jurisdictions, has
allowed the charging lien to remain a creature of the common law." 4 Despite this gradual development, Florida courts have expressly recognized
the importance of these equitable liens. 1 5 Nevertheless, providing attorneys with just compensation poses some significant difficulties which do
not exist when courts award other professionals and laborers their earned

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 93-107.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 93-107.
110. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 95-107.
113. See, e.g., Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.
2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983); Winn v. City of Cocoa, 75 So. 2d 909, 912 (Fla. 1954); Carter v. Davis, 8
Fla. 183, 201 (Fla. 1858).
114. Litman v. Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, P.A., 517 So. 2d 88, 91 (3d
DCA 1987), rev. denied, 525 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1988); see also Baucom, 428 So. 2d at 1385 (discussing the court-imposed requirements for establishing a valid charging lien).
115. See, e.g., In re Barker's Estate, 75 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 1954) ("A lawyer's compensation, like that of every man who labors, is his bread and butter. When his contract is completed he is
entitled to his pay and should not be forced to a suit to collect it.").
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income.11 6 As the court in In re Barker's Estate'1 7 stated, "Such controversies are to be avoided so far as compatible with self-respect and [the
lawyer's] right to reasonable compensation for his services." 118 Consequently, Florida courts have long preferred using equitable charging liens
pursued appurtenant to the underlying claim, rather than through a separate action at law to collect fees.' 1 9
In order to encourage the proper adjudication of an attorney charging lien, the Florida Supreme Court specified the requirements for attaching a valid charging lien in Sinclair, Louis, Heath, Nussbaum &
Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom.120 The Baucom court outlined three criteria
for the attachment of a valid charging lien. 2 First, either an express or
implied contract must exist between the attorney and the client; second,
there must be an express or implied understanding that the fee is dependant upon recovery or will be paid from the recovery; and third, an attempt to avoid payment of the fee or a dispute over its amount must have
occurred.' 22 Thus, as long as the client obtains a favorable judgment or
settlement involving recognizable proceeds, an attorney has the right to
attach a charging lien. 23 Moreover, an attorney who is discharged prior
to obtainihg a final determination for his client does not lose the right to
assert a charging lien.124
Although the Florida Supreme Court has established a preference for
the use of equitable charging liens and relatively simple guidelines for
their implementation, the disputes surrounding the proper valuation of
these claims remain counterproductive. 25 Such disputes violate both the
court's desire to avoid unnecessary conflicts between attorney and client 126
and the court's goal of providing an objective and consistent basis for

116. See generally Baruch v. Giblin, 164 So. 831, 833 (Fla. 1935) (noting that because attorneys are officers of the court, awarding their fees reflects on the administration of justice and thus

requires more careful considerations).
117. 75 So. 2d at 303.
118. Id. at 304. The court went on to say, "Litigation to recover a fee is very embarrassing and
is never resorted except in cases to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud." Id.
119. Baucom, 428 So. 2d at 1385.

120. Id. at 1383.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1385.
Id.
Litman, 517 So. 2d at 93. Litman further stated that upon successful execution of the lien,

the court determines, without a jury, the amount of fees due. Id.
124.

Id. at 93 n.7 ("mere withdrawal or discharge of the attorney before litigation is ended

does not deprive him of his right to enforce a claim of lien asserted before the close of the litigation");
de laCruz v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 245, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (stating that a claim of lien filed by a

discharged attorney before the final settlement was reached in favor of former client was not
improper).
125.
126.

See supra notes 66-69, 116-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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awarding attorney fees. 12 7 Nonetheless, problems continually arise once
the charging lien is established and the difficult task of determining the
amount of the fee begins. 2 "
In Rosenberg v. Levin,' 2 9 the Florida Supreme Court held that an
attorney discharged from a contingent fee contract prior to the occurrence
of the contingency is entitled only to the reasonable value of his services
under a quantum meruit theory. 130 However, Rosenberg involved a case
where the attorneys sought to recover their fees prior to the final determination of their former client's case.' 3' Thus, no charging lien had ever
been attached to a final judgment or settlement in that case. 132 Nonetheless, some district courts have held that Rosenberg determines the calculation of reasonable fees under all charging liens. 133 Other courts, however, have applied the standards set out in Rowe. 34 The Florida Supreme
Court has not addressed this issue. Consequently, Florida attorneys relying on contingency fee agreements to earn their livings are faced with
inconsistent decisions concerning fees if they are discharged prior to a
contingency's occurrence and seek an equitable remedy under a charging
lien. 135
IV.

CALCULATING REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES UPON EARLY
DISCHARGE FROM CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENTS

To determine the proper method of calculating reasonable attorney
fees under an equitable charging lien, analysis must begin with a quantum meruit theory, and therefore the Rosenberg rule. 3 6 Under Rosen-

127. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
128. See Schwartz, Gold & Cohen, P.A. v. Streicher, 549 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA
1989); Trend Coin Co. v. Fuller Feingold & Mallah, P.A., 538 So. 2d 919, 921-22 (Fla. 3d DCA
1989); Boyette v. Martha White Foods, 528 So. 2d 539, 541 (1st DCA), rev. denied, 538 So. 2d 1255
(Fla. 1988); Reisgo v. Weinstein, 523 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
129. 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
130. Id. at 1017.
131. Id. at 1017-18.
132. See id. As early as 1858, the Florida Supreme Court had held that quantum meruit is the
proper basis for awarding reasonable fees under a charging lien. See Carter v. Davis, 8 Fla. 183, 201
(Fla. 1858). However, the Carter court did not provide any guidelines for calculating the fee under
the quantum meruit theory. See id. at 201-03.
133. Streicher, 549 So. 2d at 1046; Trend Coin Co., 538 So. 2d at 921.
134. Boyette, 528 So. 2d at 541; Reisgo, 523 So. 2d at 754; Barton v. McGovern, 504 So. 2d
457, 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
135. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1149. While this may appear to be a very narrow issue, it strikes
at the heart of the Florida Supreme Court's purpose in adopting the lodestar method in Rowe. See id.
at 1149-50. Moreover, the fact that the court prefers the use of the charging lien to settle fee disputes
when possible exacerbates these inconsistencies. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying note 130.
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berg, an attorney discharged without cause prior to the completion of a
contingency specified under a contingency fee agreement is entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services, limited by the maximum contract fee.13 7 This modified quantum meruit rule was adopted as a means
of protecting the client's right to discharge his attorney at any time with
or without cause.'" 8 This right could be impinged if a discharged attorney
were allowed to recover based on a full quantum meruit theory should the
actual value of the services rendered exceed the contracted price.139
In addition to limiting recovery to the maximum contract price, Rosenberg required that the attorney's cause of action arise only upon a successful conclusion of the case for the client.1 40 The court justified this limitation on the basis that it furthered the ultimate goal of protecting the
client's right to discharge his attorney.' 4 ' The court further reasoned that
to hold otherwise could inflict financial harm on a client whose ability to
pay was dependant upon a successful result in the lawsuit.'42 Consequently, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that its decision in Rosenberg balanced both the right of the client to discharge and the right of the
attorney to reasonable compensation for his services. 43
Despite the limitations placed on the use of quantum meruit determinations of attorney fees, the Rosenberg court consistently stressed its desire to guarantee attorneys reasonable value for their services.14 4 When a
client benefits from an attorney's services through a favorable judgment,
the attorney must be allowed to recover for his labor.' 45 Thus, the issue is
not whether an award of fees to an attorney discharged prior to the contracted contingency is justified, but how a reasonable fee should be
calculated.

137.

Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982).

138. Id. at 1021-22.
139. See id. This could be especially problematic under contingency fee agreements when an
attorney, hoping for a large judgment or settlement expends a great deal of time on a case only to see

the subsequent attorney recover a far smaller recovery for the client than expected. See id. at 1022.
Moreover, as Professor Farnsworth indicates, "Not using the contract price as a ceiling on recovery
may result in a more generous recovery for part performance than would have been allowed for full
performance." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.20, at 954 (2d ed. 1990).
140. Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1022.

141. Id. The Court recognized that this rule was not universally accepted. Id. However, it reasoned that the policy goals of protecting the client's right to discharge outweighed what it stated was

minimal harm to the attorney. Id.
142. Id. at 1020 (citing Francasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972)). Moreover, this re-

quirement comports with the charging lien doctrine which requires that the client first obtain recognizable fruits before the attorney may harvest his fees. See Litman, 517 So. 2d at 91-93.
143. Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1022.
144. Id. at 1021-22.

145. See id.
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Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine which literally means "as
much as deserved."' 46 The underlying basis for such an award is a restitution theory by which the parties are restored to the positions they occu47
pied prior to entering the contract.
To succeed under quantum meruit, one party must have conferred a
benefit to the other party so as to unjustly enrich the receiving party. 4 8 In
the case of attorney fees, the discharged attorney seeking quantum meruit
must show that she conferred, "something tangible and definite like services performed, advice given, means expended, effort put out, or energy
exploited through some other legally approved channel.' 49 The Rosenberg court stated that the computation of fees should be based on a consideration of "the totality of the circumstances surrounding the professional relationship between the attorney and client."' 50 The court listed
"relevant considerations" for fee calculations, but provided no specific
51
guidelines delineating how those considerations were to be quantified.1
Such ambiguities raise the question of whether Rowe's purpose of providing trial courts with a more objective and consistent method of computing
reasonable attorney fees' 5 superseded the more subjective guidelines described in Rosenberg 53 when calculating reasonable fees under an equitable charging lien. If Rowe's purpose of providing objectivity supersedes
Rosenberg's generalities, the lodestar method should be applied to quantum meruit determinations of reasonable fees awarded to attorneys pursuant to valid charging liens.
This result is supported by Rowe and subsequent Florida Supreme
Court decisions. 54 The underlying purpose of Rowe was to provide trial
courts with an analytical framework to calculate reasonable attorney fees
objectively and consistently. 55 Thus, while the court noted that different
classes of cases may require different criteria for calculating reasonable
fees, within each class awards should be consistent. 56 In Quanstrom, the
Florida Supreme Court held that Rowe's lodestar method should be used

146. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (6th ed. 1990).
147. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 139, § 2.20, at 103 & n.4.
148. See id. at 104.
149. Baruch v. Giblin, 164 So. 831, 834 (Fla. 1935).
150. Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1022.
151. Id. The Rosenberg court noted that "factors such as time, recovery sought, the skill demanded, the results obtained, and the attorney-client contract itself will necessarily be relevant considerations." Id.
152. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 155-57.
155. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
156. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 833-35.
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in tort and contract cases. 57 Cases involving attorney fees awarded after
an attorney is discharged are grounded in contract principles and often
ancillary to a client's tort claim. Thus, to treat these cases as if they were
distinct from torts and contracts would violate the goals of objectivity and
consistency sought by the court.
Moreover, Rowe adopted the Rosenberg proposition that in all cases
attorney fees should be limited to the maximum contract amount. 158 By
incorporating Rosenberg and not distinguishing its application, the Rowe
court implied that the two cases should be read together. Consequently,
courts applying a quantum meruit analysis should employ the lodestar
method outlined in Rowe to calculate a reasonable fee for a preinaturely
discharged attorney. 159 Because the attorney charging lien is simply- another type of quantum meruit case instituted after an attorney is discharged by the client, 160 the same lodestar principles should apply to its
calculation. 6 ' The only remaining issue is whether a quantum meruit calculation of reasonable fees after discharge from a contingency agreement
should include the use of a contingency risk multiplier.
Professor Farnsworth describes the purpose of restitution 6 2 as: "[T] o
put the party in breach back in the position that party would . . . have
been in if the contract had not been made."' 63 In other words, restitution
attempts to reimburse the nonbreaching party for the benefits she conferred on the breaching party. 6 4 In the context of attorney fees for discharged attorneys, the court should strive to calculate the reasonable
value of all benefits conferred upon the client, limited by the maximum
contract fee.' 65 Attorneys accepting cases on a contingency fee basis accept a risk of nonpayment which varies from case to case. 66 If the attorney's work has increased the chance of recovery for the client, the attorney has conferred a tangible benefit upon the client.16 7 If the attorney is
subsequently discharged and a second attorney sees the case to its suc-

157. Id. at 834.
158. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 67-79.
160. See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
161. See Riesgo v. Weinstein, 523 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Barton v. McGovern,
504 So. 2d 457, 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
162. FARNSWORTH, supra note 139, § 12.19, at 947. Quantum meruit is a subcategory of the
general remedy of restitution. Id. § 2.20, at 103.
163. Id. § 12.19, at 947.
164. See id. at 946.
165. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
166. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151 (implicitly recognizing that different cases have varying
amounts of risk by giving different risk multipliers based on the level of risk associated with a case).
167. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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cessful completion, the first attorney's reduction of risk will have positively affected the result obtained. Therefore, a contingency risk multiplier should be used to compensate attorneys for the risk they accept and
subsequently reduce for the client, pursuant to the contingency fee agreements from which they are discharged.
Attorneys who accept cases on a full contingency fee basis do so at
the risk of receiving no payment for their services. 16 8 Thus, the fee specified in the contract is generally higher than the fee charged to a client
who agrees to pay regardless of the outcome of the case.1 9 However,
when the attorney is discharged, the contract is no longer a basis for
awarding damages under a charging lien based on quantum meruit.' 70
Therefore, to grant full restitution to a discharged attorney pursuant to a
charging lien, the court must account for the risk accepted and reduced
171
by the attorney.
In addition to the theoretical basis for this conclusion, the realities of
legal practice call for the same result. Few qualified attorneys will seek
difficult cases if those cases can be stolen away by other attorneys prior to
a final settlement or adjudication in favor of the client if the initial attorney is limited to a base lodestar figure under a quantum meruit recovery.
Difficult cases often take months or years to be settled or adjudicated
favorably.172 Clients may become impatient and be easily swayed to
change attorneys midstream, when another attorney promises a quick and
seemingly beneficial settlement based primarily on the first attorney's labor. Assuming the first attorney attaches a charging lien to the judgment
obtained by the second attorney, denying the application of a risk multiplier to the lodestar figure would deprive the first attorney of a reasonable
fee. 173 Moreover, the second attorney would be unjustly enriched by reap-

168. Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1021. The Rosenberg court noted that a quantum meruit action
would arise only "upon the successful occurrence of the contingency." Id. at 1022 (emphasis added).
169. See supra note 26.
170. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. However, the contract may be used as
evidence of the value of the benefit conferred. FARNSWORTH, supra note 139, § 12.20, at 952.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
172. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
173. For example: An attorney accepts a difficult case and charges a 40% contingency fee. The
attorney then works the case into a good posture for a positive resolution. However, the client then
discharges the attorney and hires a second attorney, who only charges the client a 20% contingency
fee because the case is now less risky. The first attorney attaches a charging lien to the final settlement or judgment. However, the first attorney is limited to the base lodestar calculation of hours
expended times the reasonable rate per hour. Because the first attorney accepted the case on a contingency basis, he probably has not kept strict time records and may not have set an hourly rate. Therefore, the court will be forced to determine the reasonable hours and rates which will likely be less
than those actually incurred by the attorney. See Sternlight, supra note 51, at 595. The end result is
likely to be far less than the 40% the first attorney bargained for, and could be less than 20%. If less
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ing the benefits of the risk reduced by the first attorney. However, application of a risk multiplier to an attorney charging lien calculation
must be
17 4
limited to avoid granting an attorney a windfall profit.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The contingency risk multiplier must be limited when applied to calculating fees pursuant to charging liens to ensure that discharged attorneys are compensated only for the risk they reduce through their efforts.
The purpose of quantum meruit is to provide restitution only for benefits
actually conferred.1' Thus, an attorney is entitled only to restitution for
76
the amount of risk actually reduced.
Cases with a fifty percent chance of recovery may entitle the attorney to a risk multiplier of 2.0 if the case is won.177 However, if an attorney does only minimal work on a case prior to discharge and does not
measurably reduce the risk of recovery, the attorney should not be compensated for simply accepting risk. 78 Consequently, this type of attorney
should be limited to the basic lodestar figure, with no enhancement by a
19
contingency risk multiplier.
Alternatively, an attorney should obtain a more favorable result if
the attorney's efforts guarantee a positive resolution to a case which began with only a fifty percent chance of recovery. 8 0 In such a case, the
maximum risk multiplier that is applicable should be used if the attorney
is discharged prior to a final result.' 8' This approach is equitable because
the discharged attorney effectively eliminated the risk of nonrecovery,
thus conferring a substantial benefit to the client.' 8 2
These extremes are the easy cases. Cases between the extremes are
more problematic. Difficulties easily arise in determining how much risk
was reduced by an attorney prior to his discharge, compared to the risk

than 20%, the client will have avoided paying the total contingency fee contracted for with the first
attorney, by denying his first attorney just compensation for services rendered. Additionally, had the
first attorney known his fees would be determined without consideration of the risk he accepted, it is
unlikely he would have taken the case in the first place. See Delaware Valley I, 483 U.S. at 742
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
174. See Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
176. See supra notes 146-49, 171 and accompanying text.
177. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834. Under Quanstrom, an even chance of recovery calls for a
multiplier between 1.5 and 2.0. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
181. See supra note 177.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
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reduced by the subsequent attorney who won the case.' 83 However, the
use of expert testimony can help eliminate this problem. Expert testimony
is already often used to establish reasonable hours and rates for the lodestar calculation because of the requirement that courts point to specific
evidence to support their findings. 8 4 Additionally, it is not necessary to
determine the amount of risk actually accepted by the winning attorney
because it is already accounted for in his contract with the client. Thus, a
zero-sum game is not played. Consequently, while the task of quantifying
risk is daunting, it is not overwhelming.
In order to quantify an equitable contingency risk multiplier, the following analytical framework should be employed. First, the court should
determine the base lodestar figure by applying the method outlined in
Rowe.'85 Second, referring to specific evidence, the court should determine the risk of nonrecovery at the time the discharged attorney accepted
the case.'8 6 Third, the court should determine the proper risk multiplier
according to the requirements specified in Quanstrom.18 7 Fourth, the
court must determine whether the work done by the attorney prior to discharge reduced the risk of nonrecovery. 188 If there was no risk reduction,
the lodestar figure represents a quantum meruit calculation of reasonable
fees and no multiplier should be used.' 9 However, if the work done by
the discharged attorney substantially eliminated the risk of nonrecovery,
the lodestar should be adjusted by the entire multiplier assigned by the
court.'

As indicated previously, failure to reduce risk and substantial elimination of risk are the easy cases. Most situations will involve risk reduction somewhere between these two extremes. In recognition of this, a determination by the court that the discharged attorney reduced the risk of
nonrecovery by a percentage between 0% and 100% would trigger the

183. Cf. Swain v. Curry, 595 So. 2d 168, 173 (1st DCA) (noting that in many areas determining the amount of damages is elusive), rev. denied, 601 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1992). However, just because
something is difficult to prove, a party should not be precluded from trying to prove the issue. See id.
In Swain, the First District Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff to present evidence to prove quantifiable damages resulting from fear of a recurrence of cancer. Id. Despite the court's recognition that
fear is difficult to quantify, it refused to prohibit the plaintiff from making the attempt. Id. The same
situation presents itself in the context of proving lost future profits. See Twyman v. Roell, 166 So. 215
(Fla. 1936); Sampley v. Laurilla, 404 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
184. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151 (stating that a court must give specific findings to support
the fee awarded).
185. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying note 184.
187. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 174-79.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 174-77.
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use of the following equation:
x(m - 1) + 1.191

For example, if the work done by a discharged attorney reduced the risk
of nonrecovery by 50%, and the court determined that a full multiplier
would be 2, the equation would be: 0.50(2 - 1) + 1
1.5. Alternatively,
if an attorney reduced the risk of nonrecovery by 25 %, the full multiplier
may be 1.25. The adjusted multiplier would thus be: .25(1.25 - 1) + 1 =
1.0625. This adjusted multiplier would then be used to enhance the base
9
lodestar figure as indicated by both Rowe' 9 ' and Quanstrom.13
Using this equation would allow the court to determine an adjusted
contingency risk multiplier that more accurately reflects a quantum meruit calculation of reasonable fees awarded under a charging lien. Under
this system, attorneys would be compensated only for the actual risk reduced by their labor prior to discharge, and the client would only pay for
the actual benefit conferred to him. In short, attorneys would receive their
reasonable fees, 94 clients would pay only for services they actually received,19 5 and the Florida Supreme Court's goal of providing an objective
and consistent system for determining fees would be served. 196
VI.

CONCLUSION

Both the lodestar method of determining a base reasonable attorney
fee award and a contingency risk multiplier should be used to calculate
reasonable attorney fees under valid charging liens. The lodestar method
as outlined in Rowe 197 and modified in Quanstrom9 8 does not significantly alter the criteria currently used to determine fees; it simply places
those criteria within a more structured, analytical framework.' 99 While
such a framework may seem cumbersome, it encourages courts to be more

191. The variable x represents the percentage the attorney has reduced the risk of nonrecovery,
while the variable m represents the original contingency multiplier determined by the court to apply

at the outset of the case. The equation takes into account the fact that if attorneys do not reduce the
risk of nonrecovery they should receive an adjusted multiplier of one, the unenhanced lodestar
amount. The equation would be as follows: 0(m - 1) + 1 = 1. Whereas, if the attorney completely
reduced the risk of nonrecovery she should receive the full multiplier. The equation would be as
follows: 1(m - 1) + I = m.
192. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151.

193. See Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834.
194. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.

195. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
196. See
197. See
198. See
199. ,See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

66-70 and accompanying text.
66-70 and accompanying text.
86-111 and accompanying text.
66-70 and accompanying text.
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diligent in justifying awards of attorney fees.2 0 Moreover, because courts
must point to specific evidence to justify their awards under this system, 20 1 attorneys will be compelled to keep more accurate records of their
time spent and work done to support their fee arguments. As a result,
attorneys will become more accountable for the work they do, or claim to
do, for their clients.
Arguments made against the contingency risk multiplier are, for the
20 2
most part, based on economic theory rather than the reality of practice.
These arguments tend to support limiting the use of contingency fee multipliers pursuant to fee-shifting statutes.2 "' However, when calculating a
reasonable attorney fee under a quantum meruit theory, the realities of a
contingency multiplier are far more compelling than the economic
theories.2 °4
The multiplier is a significant aid in determining the value of actual
benefits conferred upon a client prior to the attorney's discharge. 0 5 Nonetheless, its use must be limited to avoid giving attorneys a windfall
profit.20 6 Consequently, the suggested "adjusted" multiplier offsets this
potential problem by quantifying only the amount of risk the attorney
alleviated prior to his discharge.20 7 Thus, the client pays only for the benefit actually conferred.20 8
When investigating the myriad of issues and theories surrounding the
calculation of attorney fees, the forest can easily be lost amidst the trees.
Quantifying risk and determining reasonable hours and rates without specific guidelines requires a sleight of hand by the courts. Because such
ethereal elements must be quantified, both attorneys and clients can easily
cry foul when fee awards do not match their expectations. Thus, it is imperative for the courts to point to specific findings supporting their decisions while applying an objective and consistent framework for calculating
fees.20 9 Using this framework encourages attorneys to present well documented and expressly defined claims supplying the evidence necessary to
support both the lodestar and risk multiplier calculations.
The lodestar method and contingency risk multiplier provide the type
of framework necessary to ensure objectivity and consistency when calcu-

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
supra notes 99-102, 184 and accompanying text.
supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text.
supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying note 174.
supra text accompanying notes 175-93.
supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
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161

lating reasonable attorney fees. Using this system provides attorneys with
fee awards corresponding to the reasonable value of their services, while
ensuring that clients will pay only for the services they receive. Moreover,
the strict proof requirements serve to encourage attorneys to be more efficient and conscientious in maintaining their records. Consequently, contingency fee based claims will still be attractive to attorneys, and people
of lesser means will still have access to the courts.
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